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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR WHITE: My name is Penny White and I am
the Director for the Center for Advocacy and Dispute
Resolution and the faculty advisor for the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy along with Dr. Otis Stephens.
I want to begin by telling a story. It's an automobile
accident case. A simple car wreck. The lawyers are good.
They're well experienced. They know how important it is
to communicate with juries. The law is clear. The judge is
learned. The judge is not only learned, but patient. Does
this sound like a dream world so far?
The judge has carefully instructed the jury on the
law. The jury has been in deliberations for about three
hours when there is knock, knock, knock on the door. A
question. These are the jury's questions: What are the
three lawsuits? What damages have been done? Who is
suing whom, for what? These really were questions written
by Tennessee jurors in a lawsuit within the last several
years.
It is my honor to welcome you to the first Summers-
Wyatt symposium and to begin by expressing our gratitude
to the members of the Summers-Wyatt law firm for the
opportunity to come together. We are lawyers and judges.
We are linguists and psychologists. We are students and
citizens. We have come to confront the question: Are we
asking jurors to do the impossible?
Because of the abiding faith in the American Justice
System and a tireless devotion to the protection of
individual rights that the members of the Summers-Wyatt
law firm has, they have generously enabled the College of
Law and the Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution
to partner with the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
and host this symposium. Join me in thanking them. Not
only will this symposium have an effect hopefully on those
of you in the audience today, but it will also have a lasting
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effect because these proceedings, as well as the papers of
the experts who speak with us today, will be published in a
special edition of the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy.
Now, I would like to introduce to you the person who
makes all of these efforts at the law school possible by his
continuing support and his endless energy, Dean Blaze.
DEAN BLAZE: Well, welcome to the law school. On
behalf of everybody here, we are really excited to have you.
Now, we're talking about juries, but it's kind of intimidating
when you look out at the audience and the jury that you're
talking to is made up entirely of judges or primarily of
judges. I'm used to talking to law students, I'm used to
talking to lawyers. Your Honors, welcome and we're glad
you're here and participating. This is an exceptional
program that Penny and the Journal have put together. I
want to add my thanks to the Summers-Wyatt law firm for
everything you've done to make this possible, for your
ongoing support for the law school. And to the students, I
want to add my thanks for everything you've done, the staff
of the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy.
You know, we're excited to have this because this is
a perfect place for this kind of program. This law school
is-I'm going to sound like a Dean-but I firmly believe
that it's the best place in the country for training people to
be lawyers. Whether they want to be transactional lawyers,
whether they want to be a general practitioner, whether
they want to go to a law firm, whether a large firm, or
whether they want to be advocates in the courtroom, this is
the best place for it.
This is an incredibly important topic. It is a topic
that is near and dear to my heart. In fact, Professor Dumas
and I had a research project going for a while on the
"heinous, atrocious, and cruel" instructions being used in
Tennessee. We were going to explore the
comprehensibility of that. We had a survey set up. Then,
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thank God, the Sixth Circuit said: "You don't need to do
that; 'heinous, atrocious, and cruel' makes no sense. We're
not going to use it in Tennessee anymore." While I missed
doing the research with you, Bethany, I'm glad that
happened.
We're always talking about the importance of
lawyers. Lawyers are essential, but the jury system is
absolutely crucial to our system of justice. To use a very
simple example, we hold up "To Kill a Mockingbird,"
Harper Lee's book, and Atticus Finch as the best of our
legal system. Atticus was incredibly capable and
committed to justice. He stepped forward and did what
needed to be done in the small town to represent Tom
Robinson. That's fabulous and we should embrace that
image, but remember that Tom Robinson, despite having
Atticus Finch, still ran. He still ran and was killed while
escaping. Why did he run? Because the system failed him
because the jury system failed him.
Now, we're here today not to talk about bias
embedded in potential juries. We're not talking about "To
Kill a Mockingbird," Tom Robinson running, or
Scottsboro. We are talking about proper functioning of
juries and properly instructed, properly informed, properly
engaged juries can do a lot to overcome bias and can
actually make a difference in the proper functioning of our
system. In conclusion, I hope you enjoy our program, and I
hope you learn and that your thoughts are provoked today.
Thank you.
INTRODUCTION TO SYMPOSIUM
PROFESSOR WHITE: Our symposium is divided into two
distinct parts: acquisition and application. I tell you this
because it's going to be a little different than your run-of-
the-mill symposium. This morning we are in the
acquisition phase. We will acquire knowledge.
4
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Knowledge about language and how we can better
communicate with juries for the purpose of helping them
perform what the United States Supreme Court has called
the most awesome responsibility. Beginning with our
keynote speaker and a panel of distinguished individuals,
we will acquire this knowledge from a diverse group of
experts, diverse in their expertise, in their approaches, and
in their viewpoints.
After our morning of acquiring knowledge, we will
move on this afternoon to application. This afternoon,
based on a case modeled after a Tennessee decision, we
will ask lawyers and judges, aided by law students, to
contemplate jury instruction issues while a mock jury of
undergraduate students deliberates the same case in another
room. At the end of the day, we will join in again to
exchange what we have learned in the hopes that in some
small way, we will make the task of jurors less impossible
in the future.
At this point, I want to turn the program over to the
Editor-in-Chief of the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
and we'll get started. Ashley Musselman, who has worked
on this program with me since about September. Thank
you, Ashley.
MS. ASHLEY MUSSELMAN: Good morning. My name
is Ashley Musselman. I'm the Editor-in-Chief of the
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy. I want to start off by
saying, on behalf of the Tennessee Journal of Law and
Policy that you all for coming. I want to also recognize
some of the members of the board of the Journal. When I
say your name, please stand and be recognized. Ashonti
Davis, managing editor. Chris Hayden, and Ashley White,
research editors. Jade Dodds and Sara White, articles'
editors. Jonathan Buckner, publication editor. Jesyca
Westbrook, candidacy-process editor. Thank you all for
your hard work and dedication to the Journal. I would also
5
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like to thank the Journal members that were part of the
symposium committee. I would like to recognize a few of
them as well. When I say your name, please stand and be
recognized, Sally Goade, Sean McDermott, Monica Rice,
Jesyca Westbrook, Ashley White and Crystal Young.
At this time, I'd like to introduce the keynote
speaker at our event today, Peter Tiersma. Dr. Tiersma is a
Professor of Law at Loyola University in Los Angeles,
California. He is a nationally renowned speaker and expert
in writing comprehensible jury instructions. He has written
extensively on language and the law and on jury
instructions. His recent publications include
"Communicating with Juries," "How to Draft a More
Understandable Jury Instruction," "Some Myths about
Legal Language," and "Speaking of Crime: The Language
of Criminal Justice." So, without further ado, please join
me in welcoming Dr. Tiersma.
[Professor Tiersma's keynote speech was a
summary of his article, Asking Jurors To Do the
Impossible, located on pages 105 to 147 of this journal.
Following his presentation, he was asked the following
questions.]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
MS. MEREDITH RAMBO: You had mentioned what you
called the gag rule. Basically about how it's been
impossible to keep jurors from talking to each other during
the entire process versus in deliberation, but then later you
had mentioned something about being lie detectors and
twelve heads being better than one. Don't you run into the
fact that if jurors are conversing during the entire process,
that one person's bias may influence how those other jurors
hear the evidence and process it themselves? Might the
6
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problem arise that this may lead one person to make the
judgment?
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: Well, that, I suppose, is the
concern. That's probably the reason you have those
restrictions. The ABA came up with a rule recently, which
allows jurors, as a group to discuss things during breaks,
but everyone has to be there.
That's one fairly conservative way of implementing
that idea. Yes, there is a problem if one juror is a
loudmouthed juror who dominates a discussion. I think
that's a concern. But you know, it's also a concern when
they're all together in the jury room at the end.
I know that's an answer that judges and lawyers
often have with respect to jury instructions being rather
difficult to understand. They argue that some of the jurors
are going to be relatively well educated. They can explain
it to the others. Ultimately, they'll all understand what the
instructions mean. Some research has suggested that in fact
that isn't necessarily the truth. That what happens is that
it's not the person who understands the instructions best
who explains it to the others. It's the loudmouth. That
person might understand them correctly or that person
might not understand them correctly. He or she tends very
forcefully to state his or her opinions. He or she might be
wrong; he or she might be right. So, you've got that sort of
person on just about any jury.
MR. ALEX RIEGER: Along with the gag order questions,
say there was a jury that didn't involve that loudmouth
person but still didn't have the gag rule. They deliberated
and discussed amongst themselves before all the evidence
is presented, wouldn't possibly letting them discuss early
and letting them all be together, wouldn't we still be afraid
that there would be some sort of band wagon approach,
where twelve people essentially group think their way to an
7
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 224
early answer and stubbornly and steadfastly stand by that
answer until all evidence is presented and basically just
ignore the other evidence in favor of the decision they've
already made?
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: The question is this: Is it
possible for jurors to keep an open mind? If we tell them,
"You can discuss it, but keep an open mind. You're going
to hear other evidence. You might be surprised by what
you hear."
We've got a psychologist here to tell us more about
how people reach decisions. Typically, you tend to reach a
tentative conclusion. That's going to happen regardless of
whether they discuss it or not. They're going to reach
tentative conclusions and they're going to modify that
conclusion as additional evidence comes in.
I think that jurors are fair-minded enough that if you
tell them, "Reserve judgment until the end. You can talk
about it, listen to the witnesses, you can reach a tentative
conclusion. You've got to listen to the other jurors and
reserve your final judgment until the end." I think they
should be capable of doing that. We actually have a certain
amount of evidence on this from Arizona. Jury experts
have been looking at actual deliberations. Shari Diamond
has written about this very issue. She concluded that there
are some dangers to this, but that overall the process seems
to be working pretty well.
JUDGE ROBERT CHILDERS: Have there been any
studies on group dynamics, particularly on group dynamics
in the jury in a court setting that are allowed to talk to
jurors. What about a group of jurors getting together and
having lunch every day and that sort of thing and the group
just sort of leads the jury in the direction that they want to
go during the deliberations? Are you familiar with any
studies on group dynamics?
8
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 225
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: Well, no, that's not an area that
I'm really an expert on to be honest. I mean I'm a law
professor and I used to be a linguist, so I'm really
concentrating on language.
PROFESSOR WHITE: I want to ask the last one. As an
evidence professor, I'm struck that you suggest that one
solution to unringing the bell is to specify the evidence
you're asking them to forget, which is what why we often
teach law students that they may just not want to object
because they will re-emphasize.
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: That's a strategic question for
the lawyers.
PROFESSOR WHITE: If the judge restates it, "Don't take
into consideration that the defendant assaulted his past
three girlfriends," that improves the jurors'
comprehensibility?
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: Well, does it improve juror
comprehensibility? I think it commonly does. It also
reinforces that message. So, this is very much a strategic
decision. If you really want to have an effective limiting
instruction, I think the judge would have to say, "Evidence
has been introduced that the defendant attacked his
previous girlfriends. You can consider that evidence on the
question of whether the defendant testified truthfully when
he denied doing so, but you should not consider it on the
question of guilt."
Now, once you say it that way, you begin to realize
how problematic limiting instructions are. But at least that
would focus the jury on the issue. If it's a punitive damages
case, you might say, "You've heard testimony of some
incidents that happened outside of Tennessee. You can
9
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consider that on the question of this but not that." Rather
than simply talk about other state evidence generally, you
identify exactly what you're talking about. That's my idea.
Yes, they're extremely problematic. There's no doubt.
INTRODUCTION
MS. ASHLEY MUSSELMAN: At this time, I would like
to introduce our panel. Our panel is comprised of members
of various disciplines, including law, psychology, criminal
justice, and linguistics. The panel is here today to provide
a response to this issue addressed from their perspective of
their various disciplines. So please help me in welcoming
our panelists.
Janet Ainsworth, a professor of law at Seattle
University School of Law. John Clark, III, an associate in
criminal justice at Troy University. Bethany Dumas,
Professor of English here at the University of Tennessee at
Knoxville, and David Ross, Professor of Psychology at the
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. We'll start with
Professor Ainsworth.
COMMENTS OF JANET AINSWORTH
PROFESSOR AINSWORTH: It's a real honor to be here
today and to be able to comment and make a few
observations on Professor Tiersma's interestingly titled
"Asking Juries to Do the Impossible" presentation. I'm
struck that you said this as though it's a bad thing. When I
think of the impossible things I am reminded of the line
from Alice in Wonderland. When Alice said, "Well, I can't
do that. It's impossible." The Red Queen replied, "Well, I
often believe six impossible things before breakfast."
So I guess the question that I want to ask today is:
Are these things really impossible? Lawyers and judges
can do things to make those impossible tasks that we give
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to jurors perhaps a little bit more possible. I work with
issues of language in law, but today I'm really wearing a
somewhat different hat. I was a trial attorney before
coming into the academy. I practiced criminal defense for
about eight and a half years, and tried somewhere in the
neighborhood of 100 to 150 cases-and they were virtually
all jury trials. My thinking about this issue is much less as
an academic and probably much more as a lawyer.
When Professor Tiersma talked about impossible
thinking, he talked about a great many different things that
we ask jurors to do. These tasks really fall into several
different kinds of categories. What might be instructive for
us is to think about the ways in which we can help jurors
with some of these categories, whereas others we may not
be able to do as much about. For example, Professor
Tiersma reminds us that jurors are often asked to make
decisions about issues instructed in technical language or
archaic language, or with confusing, convoluted, poorly
structured, and lengthy sentences. Those are all examples
of one set of problems-namely, that jury instructions are
often fairly opaque. They are not user-friendly.
A second problem is that jurors are often asked to
make determinations about matters that we think of as more
properly legal matters in which they have relatively little
guidance about how to think about the legal issues. Third,
we often ask jurors to make decisions in which they ought
to make decisions sequentially in some order, but we fail to
tell them that. In other words, we don't road map for them
how the various issues they are deciding may fit together.
Finally, we ask jurors to both assess the past and predict the
future, or sometimes even to construct a hypothetical
present and future as though something different had
happened in the past. All of these tasks are in some sense
impossible. I'm going to speak to each one of them briefly.
I hope to make some suggestions about ways that lawyers
11
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and judges can deal with some of these impossible tasks,
building on the things that Professor Tiersma has said.
I'm not going to speak very much about the problem
that is probably the easiest for us to do something about,
which is drafting jury instructions that make sense in plain
English. Getting rid of some of the archaic language.
Breaking sentences down into simpler sentences, not
embedding clause, upon clause, upon clause,
nominalization upon nominalization, upon
nominalization-all these can make train wrecks of jury
instructions. Rather we should make them instructions that
people can actually understand.
Simple as this sounds, there are a number of
challenges to this. For one thing, all of us today are here
because we were trained in the use of language in
specialized ways, as judges, as lawyers, as legal
professionals, and as social scientists. It's sometimes easy
for us to forget how difficult it is for ordinary jurors, who
don't have as much experience with parsing that kind of
specialized literary language to understand what it is that
we're saying. I suspect this is only going to get worse. I
keep being reminded that my students now are millennials.
They're not used to reading long things. They're not even
used to reading e-mails anymore-that's for old people.
They're not even using IM's anymore. I've been told those
are for semi-old people. Now they're twittering. I've been
told, although I don't twitter myself, that twitter limits what
you can say to 140 characters. I believe that includes
spaces. So any statement which is longer than 140
characters may be daunting to the jurors of the future. This
is something we need to think about.
My advice to lawyers in preparing to craft
instructions is to talk to the jurors in your cases when
you're finished. I've often found that jury instructions that
seemed clear and intelligible to me turned out to present
land mines for jurors. They didn't to me because I had read
12
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them so many times before and heard judges utter them so
many times before that they seemed completely obvious to
me. Only when I spoke to jurors after the trial did I
understand how confusing they were, or did I understand
that the jurors actually misapprehended the instructions. I
learned a lot about jury instructions, and frankly, I learned a
lot about lawyering generally every time I spoke to jurors
after trial. My suggestion to those of you who are in the
practicing bar is, if a judge allows you to speak with jurors
after they conclude their jury service on your case, take full
advantage of that. You'll always learn something
interesting and important from them.
I pointed out that jurors are often asked to deal with
what we might consider legal questions. Professor Tiersma
gave you a couple of examples. One example that I felt the
most vexing when I was in practice came out of a habitual
criminal statute in Washington State. This statute was an
early "three strikes and you're out" statute, which meant
that if you had three convictions of certain types of
felonies, you got a sentence of life in prison. The Supreme
Court in our jurisdiction decided that, in order to get a
conviction under the statute, all the elements needed to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the
convictions all be constitutionally valid. Therefore, the
question of the legality of any prior conviction had to be
answered by the jury. The jurors were instructed that it was
their job to determine whether prior convictions, often by
guilty pleas, were constitutionally valid beyond a
reasonable doubt.
So the jurors had to figure out whether a particular
guilty plea was constitutionally valid. This is something
that has sorely tried many judicial minds. The idea that
jurors could do it was somewhat counter-intuitive, to say
the least. Worse yet, they had to make their determination
beyond a reasonable doubt. What it means to a jury to
decide that something was constitutionally valid beyond a
13
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reasonable doubt was even more problematic. We
managed to fix that, of course, by scrapping the entire
statute and coming up with a new "three strikes and you're
out" law, which doesn't have that problem. The new statute
has a variety of other problems but that's beyond the scope
of this talk.
I think if there's a wonderful take away from the
examples that Professor Tiersma was giving to us, it's that
jurors are really not told very much about how to be jurors.
They are not given an instruction manual. They're not
given a good road map about how they should proceed.
That's easy for us to forget because those of us who are
lawyers and who are judges have seen so many jury trials
that it seems blatantly obvious how jurors ought to begin
their deliberations, how they ought to determine what the
issues are and how to decide them. In reality, that isn't
necessarily the case, and becomes particularly clear when
you talk to jurors after trial.
A greater use of meta-instructions-instructions
about instructions, instructions about how to proceed-are
certainly useful. Indeed, in Washington they've began to
use some of those meta- instructions, telling jurors how to
think about the decision making process. However, they
didn't replace the old instructions and so we now have
probably the worst of all possible worlds. For example, in
our criminal instructions in Washington, we gave an
instruction that begins, "A person commits the crime of X
when.. ." blah, blah, blah, followed by a description of the
elements of the crime. We refer to that as the "a person
commits" instruction. Jurors were sometimes confused
because they didn't understand how the elements related to
each other and whether each of the elements were essential
to conviction.
So the jury instruction committee got together and
said, "Let's come up with a new instruction-kind of a
meta-instruction. We will call that the "to convict"
14
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instruction, reading, "To convict a person of the crime of X,
you must first find X. You must then find Y. You must
then find Z. If you have found all these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it's your duty to return a verdict of guilty.
If, however, you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of
these elements, it will be your duty to return a verdict of
not guilty." But, they weren't sure whether they should get
rid of the "a person commits" instruction, so now jurors get
both. This ends up being very confusing. A number of
jurors have said, "Well, we couldn't figure out which of
those instructions was the real one. So we (a) flipped a
coin, (b) tried to apply both, (c) discarded both of them."
Those are all options that jurors have picked. You can see
that continuing to use both instructions turns out to be not
very helpful.
Cases involving lesser-included offenses provide a
classic example of an issue needing some kind of meta-
instruction that tells jurors how to make decisions about
lesser-included offenses. The suggestion is often made that
special verdict forms-verdict forms that actually walk the
jurors sequentially through the fact determinations they
have to make-can be helpful to jurors. Why then do
lawyers and judges find special verdict forms so difficult?
Why are they so resistant to using them? I think one reason
is a fear of inconsistent verdicts. If we actually could open
up the black box of a jury verdict and get something other
than "thumbs up, thumbs down," we're worried that we
might in fact find that the jurors had made inconsistent
factual findings. This would be a problem, making us face
up to facts we might prefer not to know.
One interesting potential solution to that problem
could come from technology, oddly enough. If you've
bought anything online in recent years, you probably know
that at some point they're going to show you a little box
following the sales terms that says, "I accept." You put a
little green dot in that box to get to the next screen. There's
15
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no place on that screen where you can do anything other
than to either click "I accept" or get out of the program and
not buy the thing. If you take a technological approach to
using a special verdict, you could set the form so that once
the jurors made a particular determination; they would
never then see the rest of the instructions that no longer
were relevant. For example, in a lesser-included offense
situation, you could actually have the jurors get a little box
to check if they found the defendant guilty of the greater
offense. If they check that box, they never see the follow-
up screens asking them to consider lesser offenses. If they
find the defendant not guilty of the greater offense, then up
pops the next screen instructing them on the lesser offenses.
This electronic jury verdict form would get rid of the
distracting things jurors don't need to consider but instead
give them forms describing the issues that they really need
to decide in the case.
With respect to the impossibility of predicting the
future and dealing with hypothetical futures like, for
example, what would have happened if the disease had
been appropriately diagnosed, let me say this. It is true that
jurors are certainly not able to do that, but nobody else is
either. I think that actually telling the jurors that explicitly
is not a bad idea. Jurors get nervous about not being able to
perform their job correctly. If you can tell them that some
things are inherently not knowable by anyone, not just by
them because they're not legally trained, but by any of us,
legally trained or otherwise, they feel much more
comfortable about making the kind of determinations that
we ask them to do.
If juries are in fact asked to do the impossible, as
Professor Tiersma suggests very colorfully that they are, it
only seems fair to encourage lawyers and judges to do the
merely challenging-that is, to assist them in performing
their roles. If we do this through better instructions, we
may help make the impossible for jurors into the merely
16
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challenging, whether it is in fact before or after breakfast.
Thank you.
COMMENTS OF JOHN W. CLARK III
PROFESSOR CLARK: It's good to be here. I just kind of
tell it like it is. That's always been my approach. I'm real
straightforward and I conduct a lot of jury research. I am
very passionate about this idea of twelve persons coming
together and trying to deliberate and ultimately reach a
verdict. Back in 2000, I was really thinking a lot about the
criminal justice system, law enforcement, courts and
corrections, and equity, due process. I remember in
graduate school thinking about where I want to go with
this. I love the legal system. I love engaging in dialogue
with attorneys and judges. I mean I've really been
fortunate. I owe my career to judges who gave me the
opportunity to conduct jury research.
I've surveyed, examined, and discussed a lot of
different studies, attitudes, ideologies, personalities,
technology, mental retardation with jurors. I've actually
examined, met with, and discussed over 4,000 since 2000.
And predominantly this is all in Alabama and some in
Texas. I've always been, as I say today, a straight shooter
with this. I very much appreciate the professor's opening if
you will. I've learned a lot. I've thought a lot about jury
instructions. One of the words that I've heard today is
control.
Well, I drove here because I wanted to be in control
rather than fly. Because I'm not in control. So I can
control so much. I mean I am very eclectic. You can tell
already. I've heard this idea of functioning. Functioning.
Well, I'm probably dysfunctional, as well as most of
society. Our society, you could argue, is dysfunctional and
then we try to make them functional in a jury system that
is, some would argue, dysfunctional. We have a lot of
17
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dysfunction going on. It seems that we're trying to make it
functional. If this doesn't make sense, then it might later.
If you drink a beer, it might then. I do my best work, you
know, late at night. I've written my best articles late at
night.
But with that said, tomorrow it may even make
better sense. With that being said, this idea of truth and this
idea of equity, and sometimes I get really caught up on it, is
that really what it's about? I mean is that what we want? I
think more times than not, we all get caught up in our
prescribed rules and our processes in the roles that we
follow. Sometimes we tend to forget control, function,
truth, and equity. What are we really trying to do? I'm
really in it for the pure essence of finding out something
and going in to examine something.
I've had the real unique opportunity to speak to a lot
of different persons before. Whether it's law school
students, or undergraduate students, graduate students,
attorneys, and judges. They'll all tell you, in the past, that I
just come at it the way I come at it in my approach. I really
do think that we need to recognize again, when it comes to
jurors, that they do have their own lives. I've conducted a
lot of research in this stuff. And I've met with a lot of
jurors as I've indicated.
Jurors have their own lives. We summon them and
we're lucky to get probably half of all that go out. There's
already this idea of cross representation and how many
jurors are we truly bringing in. Nonetheless, we take them
from their lives where it's chaotic-there's work, kids,
responsibilities, trying to keep a job, the economy that we
live in. Nonetheless, they have a life. We ask them to
come down to this foreign atmosphere, and foreign room.
We place them in some really unusual situations.
Nonetheless, we put them in this environment and
we expect so much from them. They're just out of their
element. We have to understand that. They have their own
18
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lives. We've got to understand and recognize we're taking
them from their world and putting them somewhere that
may be very different. I think sometimes we lose focus of
that.
We also, secondly, must recognize that when it
comes to jurors, they have their own personalities. So, I
think this is really cool because we're thinking about jury
instructions. We're really focused on meticulously and the
semantics and the lexicon and putting these words in place
and trying to make sure that the instructions and it's just
right. We all need to do the best that we can.
With that being said, we can be perfect on
instructions. Then think back to yourself when you were in
school. How many people follow the instructions? You
take a test and it gives you instructions. How many people
don't follow instructions? So there's something to be said
for that. Think about the personalities. Think about
attitudes. Think about ideology. How is this and
instructions related? Well, the case could be made that no
matter how good a job we do it might not matter.
No matter how good we come across with
instructions, and we want to maintain control as we've
already indicated. We want jurors to function, as they need
to function. But can we ever get away from recognizing
what jurors bring in when we come inside the threshold of
the courtroom door. Never forget or just accept the
personality, attitudes, and ideology that's brought inside
these courtrooms.
Ultimately, you could have the greatest instructions
but we all must recognize that there's some things that we
can't control. Because I'm extraverted and I score high on
neuroticism. I score high on openness. I score high on
conscientiousness. I score very low on agreeableness,
which means I don't really get along with a lot of people.
That's called the five factor model personality.
When you think about, again, recognizing control and
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function and everything that works fine. The point is
there's a human dynamic to this. There's a human element,
and that's what I want everyone to recognize. Of course,
judges, attorneys, and the law students especially. There's
the individuality. There's this discussion of understanding
that you select.
We're thinking about trial advocacy, thinking about
twelve jurors and some alternates. Ultimately, there's this
idea of it's better to have twelve than to have one.
Understand that when jurors are deliberating, and this is
important, the twelve become one. This is fascinating. As
a trial attorney, you select individuals and excuse.
Ultimately, twelve do make one. The key to this, to how
much and how important the one becomes is with the
passage of time. If it's a real slam shut case and the
strength of evidence is very strong, the twelve may not
necessarily come to be one. With the passage of more
time, the twelve mold together. That's when you get into a
collective personality. I think that's really important and
that's not really mentioned a lot in the literature. You may
go out and you look for individuals that you think are best
suited for the case at hand, but ultimately, the twelve, with
enough time, could easily become one.
With respect to note taking, I think maybe it's not
necessarily a bad thing. I know there's the pros and the
cons for that. But, maybe if we're in the courtroom and it's
isolated and they're writing something, maybe something's
pertinent enough. That does show a degree of
conscientiousness, and maybe it could be germane later in
the deliberations.
With respect to discussing this with other jurors:
we must keep in mind, no matter what we do, jurors are
going to discuss the case with other persons. That's the
reality of this. We have to accept that. Whether they
discuss it amongst themselves, but more importantly,
without them being sequestered, going to their homes and
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at night. It's so abnormal not to talk at times and discuss.
Whether it's a family member, whether it's a friend, they
will get it off their chest. It's a stressful situation. They are
taken from their lives and responsibilities into a trial. Even
more importantly, they are exposed to very visual, very
graphic, very heinous evidence. They want to talk about it.
They may also want to take notes.
Another thing we must recognize in this process is
the debriefing. We should debrief and allow the
recognition that jurors go through a lot in some instances.
Having some sort of psychological debriefing program is
important. Throughout this country, you really do not find
that. There are a few other counties throughout the
country, such as King County, which debrief.
I have plenty of examples to demonstrate
psychological issues that jurors have encountered after the
fact-Aduring the trial and even afterwards. Ultimately,
jurors like technology as well. So as the instructions and
thinking about, are we asking jurors to do the impossible. I
know how savvy individuals are. I know that the
technology is important in the twenty-first century. Jurors
are expecting certain things.
COMMENTS OF BETHANY DUMAS
PROFESSOR DUMAS: Let me introduce myself briefly
for those of you whom I do not know yet. I am delighted to
be here. I am always pleased and honored to be involved
with this College of Law in any way at all. I have been
since my first days here, although they were not always
extremely easy and pleasant days. Just a very brief
comment or two about where I come from with respect to
all of this: I began life as an English major-well, not
quite, but near the third grade I think. I was going to be a
literature professor definitely I decided. I've been thinking
about my life as I've been listening to others this morning
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and thinking about how is it that I got led to be here this
morning talking about what I'm going to be talking about
this morning. Looking back, I've always been, in a sense,
data driven. I'll give you one example of what I mean by
that. I got part of the way through a Ph.D. in Literature and
then I had to take some philology courses-Old English,
history of the English language, Beowulf in the original
language. You know, you read six lines of it once. I fell in
love with that. I thought this is wonderful. This is what
life is really about is each time you would pull those from
the page from the year 450.
At a certain point, I also was tired of not ever, ever,
ever having any money at all. I decided I would teach for a
year or two in this and then finish my doctorate. So I
taught literature courses for two years at a state college. I
hated it. Then I got an opportunity to teach at another
university for a year and I took it. Then I took a job over
the telephone at Southern University in Baton Rouge in
1964. I went down to Baton Rouge to teach at the largest
essentially all black state supported university in the
country. It was one of the more educational things I've
done in life I took the job because of the fact that I thought
I would learn something. In 1964, there were no books and
really no articles on what at that time we were calling
Black English or African American English. Most of my
students were from small southern towns in Southern
Louisiana. Many of them, quite frankly, had never
interacted much with a white person other than a store clerk
or a postal clerk. So, we had some communication
problems. I was very fortunate in that the department head
at Southern, shortly after I got there, became Melvin Butler,
who was African American and who was a linguist.
So when I got stuck, I would go to Melvin and say,
"Tell me what's going on. Tell me what to do. Tell me
what I need to know that I don't know already." I had
already taken some linguistic courses in language variation
22
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 239
and dialect studies, but that year, I decided that I wanted to
understand why the kind of variations that exist in the
American English exist, and why was it that we couldn't
talk to each other more easily. I actually changed into a
linguistics concentration that year. It was that particular
trip. That's what I mean by being data driven. This I was
interested in. It was exciting. I wanted to understand it.
So I did finish in linguistics and did research in language
variations beginning with Ozark English and moving to
Tennessee to continue my studies of Appalachian English.
I had been here four or five years. I was wondering,
do I want to run around with a tape recorder doing this kind
of study all my career or will I want to do something
different at a certain point? Understand that I had never
been remotely interested in the law, except to stay as far
away from it as possible as a graduate student.
More or less by accident, I read that 1980, '81
article by Ferro and Ferro, the short version of the
Columbia Law Review article on why jurors don't
understand jury instructions. They had actually conducted
a careful research in the Washington D.C. area, about that
particular point. I read that. The short article fascinated
me, and I went and read the long law review article. I
guess it was the first law review article I ever read. I
decided that judges, Your Honors, and lawyers needed to
know something about language that linguists know. I
decided that I wanted to help teach judges and lawyers.
However, I couldn't think of any reason why any of them
would listen to me.
So I decided that I needed to understand legal
process. I thought I could do it in one year. I quietly got
myself admitted to the College of Law, and for four years
between 1981 and '85, I taught full-time except for the final
year, and I also came over here to begin my real education.
That's how I got where I am. Jury instructions have been a
passion of mine for a long time, and some of the work that
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I've done has actually resulted in some detailed
examinations of the kinds of things that Peter has told us
about and written about extensively.
One of the fortunate things that happened to me
fairly early in the beginning of this research is that Judge
Inman corresponded with me, and over a period of years he
shared with me some of his solutions to some of the
policies we're discussing. One is paraphrasing entire
instructions. Another involves pre-narrative examples,
which are not extremely popular with judges. I understand
why. But, he shared a number of those kinds of things with
me.
For instance, just to show you one short example,
talking to a jury about the concept of present cash value.
Most jurors are not accountants, and so that is kind-of a
strange phrase. If we examine the pattern of instruction in
Tennessee, I won't read that. We could go get the
paraphrasing. It makes the language a little bit simpler.
We could even add a brief example. Hopefully, the simple
example will be of some benefit.
If you know that a person will need $1,000.00 five
years from now, you would normally not give him the
$1,000.00 now. Well, in today's market, actually, you
probably would. Maybe you would give him $2,000.00.
But if you were required to give him money now, you
would give him only the amount of money which, when
invested, back when we could invest, would equal
$1,000.00 in five years. How much that money should be
now is for you to decide. That would be kind of a narrative
paraphrasing example that I learned the existence of from
Judge Inman.
Another example, and I'm going to show you one
more, would be something like proximate cause, which
might include both positive and negative examples. There
again, of course, from Judge Inman. Some of these legal
concepts or principles can be difficult for laypersons to
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understand. I hope this example will illustrate for you a
practical example of proximate cause. It is negligent for a
driver to drive a car that has bad or slick tires. If that
automobile with bad tires slammed into the rear of a car
because the driver could not stop due to a combination of
slick tires and wet pavement, then the negligence of the
driver in driving with bad tires would be a proximate cause
of the accident.
Of course, the other problem here is that
"proximate" sounds to a layperson like "approximate," a
very different meaning. But, it is possible for the person to
be negligent without that negligence being a proximate
cause of the accident. If the driver of that car with bad tires
is stopped for a red light and is struck in the rear by another
car, obviously the bad tires had nothing to do with the
accident. In other words, the driver's negligence in driving
a car with bad tires was not a proximate cause of that
accident. This is a straightforward example it seems to me.
I'd love to go through the history of having juries in
the U.S., but I will not. I will move to trials just a little bit.
Let me say, before I move into this, that my head is filled
this morning with data, and it's a little bit different from
what it had been filled with while I had been standing here
in the past years. I have been focused a lot upon how
undergraduate students at Duke University understand the
nature of legal process and the nature of jury service. I've
also been having two to three novels and views of films on
"To Kill a Mockingbird," "Runaway Jury," and "The
Runaway Jury" that are still in the book and other such
things.
Also, I want to mention that last fall I had the
interesting experience of challenging, pre-requiring
students to write a novel involving a lawyer. I'm teaching a
little undergraduate course-it's a special topic course. I
looked at all the special topic courses, and I didn't like any
of them, so, of course, I invented my own: Lawyers in
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Literature. We started out with the thriller, "The Runaway
Jury." We went into excerpts from novels, that kind of
thing. Then the day after the drop deadline came, I went in
and told the students what we were actually going to be
doing in class. The preceding summer, as I had been
planning the course, it occurred to me finally that 254 is a
writing intensive course, and that I was probably expected
to have all my students to write a research paper. I did not
want to read some library research papers on any topic
whatsoever. So I thought, okay, what do we write instead?
I decided that we would corroboratively write a novel.
This applied to all my students the day after the drop
deadline. They looked at me like, woman from Mars, what
are you talking about?
They didn't think we could do it or would do it.
What I had done prior to that day is to have them do some
writing exercises, both in and out of class, such that I knew
they could write sentences and weave together coherent
narratives. Those are the two things I thought they needed
to do. My motive for having them write the novel is that I
wanted to, in effect, put them in the driver's seat with
respect to fiction. I wanted them to think hard about what
does a fiction writer have to do? How do you think about
plot, how do you develop characters, how do you identify a
conflict, how do you write? How do you do all this stuff
when you're the author? So that for the rest of their lives
they might occasionally, in reading a novel, think about,
well, I wonder if he thought about going here instead, or he
thought about going there instead? That kind of thing.
Now, it was a large class for this kind of activity.
There were thirty-one students in the class. And we didn't
get to do what Ken Kesey did with his graduate students in
Oregon back in the '80s. I learned, actually after my course
started, that Ken Kesey had done this experiment once with
graduate students. Well, they came to his house twice a
week and all sat around a table and wrote a pretty bad
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novel. You can buy it if you want to. It's out in print, and
you can buy it.
We couldn't do that, I mean thirty-one students
twice a week for an hour and fifteen minutes. We
developed a plot outline. We identified our characters, our
conflict, and our resolutions; then divided ourselves into
groups to write the individual chapters. We finished a 100-
page draft. It's a bad draft. But, my requirement was not
that they write a good novel. It was that they write a
novel-a draft of a novel.
Furthermore, four of them decided they would like
to continue working on it. So they've been working all
semester this spring with me. The idea was that they would
take the 100-page draft, flush it out, and improve it. That
lasted for about four weeks. They came in the fifth week
and said, "We have an announcement to make." What's the
announcement? "We have thrown away the 100 pages and
we are starting over."
They're doing a pretty good job.
So, what's the point I'm trying to make? I wanted to
examine the extent to which untrained, laypersons,
undergraduate students, and these are not pre-law students,
would depict legal process and depict jury service.
Because I think one of the problems with jury instructions
is that jurors are regarded as sort-of minor players even
when they're doing a very major sort of function-that
they, themselves, don't have a clear picture of what a jury
service is.
I'd like to conclude by just suggesting that the
improvement of languages, the addition of paraphrasing
and narrative is extremely important. But I think that
there's a kind-of discrepancy between lip service paid to
jurors just prior to the fact and the way the jurors, in fact,
are often actually treated. I have suggested that they have
to be empowered into kind-of a lay expert they're being
asked to be. That is, the lay expert on facts. I think that the
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way they're treated in court would probably have to be
changed just a little bit. I've even suggested at one point
seriously that if in 1979 or sometime during the 1980s, or
even in the 1990s judges could have taken early research on
syntax and semantics of jury instructions totally seriously,
they might well have made or authorized changes in
sentence structure and vocabulary choice that many of us
have been advocating. But if they had done only that, I
think that would have been actually totally inadequate. It's
far more important for us to do-and I've been suggesting
this morning, to stand back and look at the whole picture of
what we're asking jurors to do when they walk into that
courtroom, what we're removing them from, what their
perceptions are as they, in fact, attempt to follow the kinds
of instructions that we are both charging them with and also
always trying to improve. I welcome your comments and
suggestions later. Thank you very much.
COMMENTS OF DAVID ROSS
PROFESSOR ROSS: My name is David Ross, and I've got
kind-of a different perspective on the topic. Don't leave.
I'm a Professor of Psychology at the University of
Tennessee Chattanooga. For many years, I've been
studying juries and eyewitness memory and doing a lot of
work. When I was in graduate school, I thought I would
get all this great science, and the legal system would just
open its arms, understand it, and want to hear about it.
Little did I know how incredibly naive I am. Part of that
education came when I met the Honorable Neal Thomas in
Chattanooga. We've been working together for many years
on issues like trying to increase juror comprehension and
things like that. It's been an incredible journey.
I wanted to share with you three points that I think
might be different here as well, that we haven't talked about
here. One of the first things I want to do is ask you a
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question. What's the literacy rate in Tennessee? Does
anybody know? Currently, the illiteracy rate, I should say,
reading level below sixth grade in Tennessee, is forty-three
percent. You know what it is nationally? Twenty-seven
percent. So the very first question that we have to ask is to
what extent are we going to match the language level of our
jury instructions to the people who come in to hear them?
First of all, as we have established today, court is a
very foreign place. It is intimidating. People don't know
about it. In fact, how many people in this room know that
we actually have a jury orientation videotape available to
every court in Tennessee? Well, the person who made that
videotape is sitting right here: Judge Thomas. His whole
idea has been to help educate jurors from the moment they
walk in the door to help them feel more comfortable.
We've done a careful research on the impact of the jury
orientation tape that makes jurors feel more comfortable,
and it increases their comprehension of the process, which
is a critically important thing. If we look at the literacy
problem, it becomes even incredibly more important.
In fact, those of you, for example, the judges-and
I'll pose this question to you as well-in your jurisdiction,
do you know what percentage of jurors show up who have
been summoned for jury duty? In Hamilton County, where
we're from, it's thirty-two percent. Thirty-two percent. The
number one reason that jurors don't show up for jury duty,
from the research, is that--does anybody want to take a
guess at it? Yes?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The mail.
PROFESSOR ROSS: The mail? This is actually a good
guess. A lot of them don't get it. But people who have
actually gotten the summons, why they don't show up?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They can't read it?
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They're not getting paid
enough.
PROFESSOR ROSS: Well-pay is a problem, plus fear of
being made a fool of. Fear of not being competent. Fear of
humiliation. That ties right into the question of how are we
going to make this entire process easier? Maybe we need
to expand the jury orientation videotape to make them
understand that they're going to hear things like jury
instructions that are going to be complex.
We do--one of the things I've done over the years
too is that I do a lot of trial consulting with attorneys. We'll
look at a jury instruction, and I'll read it and I give it to
them. Will you please tell me what this means? They don't
know. They say, "Well, I'm not really quite sure." I say,
"Well, I don't know. If you don't know, how is the jury
going to know?" So the issue of literacy and
comprehension starts from understanding who your jury
panel is, how these people are going to be competent to
understand. If you have a literacy rate of forty-three
percent, if thirty-two percent of your community shows up
for jury duty, we're looking at a substrata of our population
that we've got to pay attention to before we even start
looking at the question of jury instructions.
It's not just a jury instruction issue. It's a much
broader issue than that. Making them feel comfortable.
Making them understand the process. So that was the first
point I wanted to talk about. We really didn't hit literacy.
It's a really, really, really important problem, and it varies
even within our state when sometimes we go to real rural
communities and deal with jurors there. Literacy rates even
within counties vary enormously.
I always tell the attorneys when we're practicing for
a trial or we're working on something, that if your
presentation doesn't pass the granny test, it's not a good
one. By that, meaning-and not anything about
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grandmothers-but I use that example, Granny didn't go to
law school. It's got to be in a language that everybody can
understand. So the jury instructions have to follow or pass
the granny test. That's my first point.
My second point hasn't been, I don't think,
addressed yet today. I think this is even more problematic.
What happens when the content of the jury instructions is
wrong? Let me give you these concrete examples of our
own work. The single largest, the single biggest reason for
wrongful conviction in the criminal justice system. Does
anybody know what it is? Eyewitness testimony,
eyewitness identification. Of the first forty DNA
exoneration studies, ninety-or examples-ninety percent
of those were due to errors in line-up identification
accuracy. Five of those people were on death row waiting
to be executed. One was two hours from execution and got
a stay.
Well, if you look at the jury instructions that are
given in most states regarding how to evaluate the accuracy
of eyewitness identification, the content is wrong. The
content is wrong. We have approximately today about
3,000 studies of eyewitness identification. The typical jury
instruction to the jury is to rely on witness competence.
Competence bears little to no accurate relationship to
witness accuracy. The same thing with detail. It bears
little to no relationship to witness accuracy. So, jurors are
actually given an instruction that is just the opposite of
what the science tells them.
So, you wonder how many of those cases-and if
you look at the DNA exoneration studies that are
continuing to go on, those preventatives are still hovering
around seventy-five, eighty percent errors in line-up
identification accuracy. How much of that error in the
system is because jurors are given instructions to use to
evaluate an eyewitness that are factually wrong? That
points them in the wrong direction? Because something
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like witness competence is an extraordinarily easy thing to
manipulate. What we know from many, many studies from
the '80s is that from the time the person experiences the
event to when they actually testify, witness confidence or
competence goes like this (indicating downward). By the
time they get on the stand and they go, "Yeah, that's the
guy," that competence measure means nothing. But the
Court instructs the jury, that's what you use among other
things. So that was my second point.
I will give you another example of a very important
issue where the content of the jury instruction was wrong.
Years ago, we were interested in the issue of child
witnesses. Children were really starting to testify in court,
and legal changes were making it easier for children to
testify at very young ages. One of the issues that the courts
were concerned about was how do we protect a very young
child, a four or five-year-old child, from the trauma of
testifying? Because when the child comes in and sits in the
witness box, whom would that child typically look at?
Who's in front of the child? Who? The defendant.
Exactly.
The theory is that having the defendant there may
produce such trauma to the child that it may impact his or
her testimony or make the child unavailable to the court
because the child can't speak. It's too fearful. So, courts
started putting protective shields between children and
defendants or using video monitoring systems, where they
would leave the defendant and the jury in the courtroom,
and they would have the child directly across in the judge's
chambers.
Well, this raised the issue of what? What does this
deny the defendant? Exactly. The Sixth Amendment right
to confront his accuser. The Supreme Court of the United
States heard a number of cases on this issue in a very short
period of time. They came down with the conclusion,
based on a jury instruction, that it was not unconstitutional
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as long as the judge gave the instruction to the jury just
prior to the child testifying that the jury is to ignore-as
you talked about ignore the pink elephant in the room-
ignore the screen that's being placed between the child and
the defendant. You are not to infer anything about the guilt
or innocence of the defendant as the function of the
presence of that screen.
Their court opinion was without any data, that the
instruction was sufficient to undo any presumed prejudice
that would be introduced by that screen. Well, what does
that do? First of all, it assumes that the screen would
actually prejudice the outcome of the trial, number one.
Number two, it assumes that the jury instruction would
eliminate the prejudice. Well, at that time, there was no
data on the topic, and we had a NSF Grant to look at that.
To make a long story short, we spent an enormous amount
of money and time to look at whether this is the case, that
the presence of a screen actually increases conviction rates,
which was the concern of the court. The reasons for the
instruction.
We did a study. We did a very large-scale,
elaborate study. Not only did we find that it had not had an
impact, it had the opposite impact. That if you protect a
child and you put a protective screen between the child and
the defendant, conviction rates don't go up. They go down;
and they go down significantly. Just the opposite of what
the court concluded and argued. Moreover, what does that
do to the utility of the instruction? The instruction says
what? The instruction says, "Look. Don't let the screen
imply that the defendant is guilty." But if you look at the
data, it doesn't do that. It actually decreases conviction
rates. Just the opposite of what the court concluded. So the
content of the instruction was wrong. So if you were going
to rewrite the instruction, what would it say? It would say
the opposite, you know. Don't let the presence of the
screen make you think the defendant is not guilty.
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But actually, what it was doing, what it was really
doing is they had it backwards. The presence of the screen
was not impacting perceptions of the defendant. The
presence of the screen was impacting the perceptions of the
child. Because if you put a screen between a child and the
defendant, the assumption about the child was what? Was
what? Fragile, unreliable, had to protect it, and couldn't
rely on the testimony of the child. If you were going to
write an instruction that was actually accurate based on
data, the instruction would have been something about
don't allow the presence of the screen to influence your
judgment about the credibility of the child's testimony.
Those are the kinds of issues that I thought so
critically important. If we could correct all of the linguistic
structures, to make it easier for people to understand the
jury instructions and things like that. But the question is,
what happens when the content of the instruction is wrong?
What can we do as scientists to help supply the courts
information to correct the instruction? That's when I
started to work with Judge Thomas in asking, "Well, why
can't we just change it?" Very naively. Little did I know
how little, how difficult it is for the legal system to change
and to make these changes because of concerns about
reversibility and things like that. And I was incredibly
naive, thinking as long as we had this data, everything
would be fine. But it's really been an incredible experience
to see the interaction between science and the legal system,
and wondering, how do we get those two to mesh and
actually get the wheels of the legal system to turn a little bit
faster than they're turning, to make changes in accordance
to what we're finding in scientific studies of jurors and
issues facing the court system?
Thank you for allowing me the honor to be among
you.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
MS. ASHLEY WHITE: At this time, we're going to open
the floor up for questions for the panel.
MR. SID GILREATH: Your illustration about the
deduction of present value in a tort. We have that
instruction for deducing present value for pain and
suffering. We have an instruction before that says, "There
is no fixed rule in which to determine pain and suffering."
So we have an inconsistent situation there, and I wish that
the people who write the rules and procedures, the Supreme
Court, were here today. Anyway, that shows the
inconsistency that we have in our instructions as you talked
about in California.
PROFESSOR DUMAS: Thank you for that comment. I
don't know exactly how that committee works. But do such
committees ever have an editor who is just an editor, who
looks for things like that, rather than importing substantive
information into them? It might be an idea.
JUDGE CREED MCGINLEY: The chairman of the
committee is here. This gentleman.
PROFESSOR DUMAS: Then I'll sit down and listen. Can
you comment?
JUDGE ROBERT CHILDERS: You want me to comment?
Sure. On the Civil Pattern Jury Instructions, we completely
re-wrote several instructions after McIntyre v. Balentine
came out in 1992. As part of that, we broke up into
subdivisions or working groups and assigned each working
group a section of the instructions. We also created what
we call the Clarity Subcommittee. The Clarity
Subcommittee looked at every instruction to try to clarify,
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without changing the substance, and to try to gender
neutralize the instructions as much as possible. So we did
that.
Unfortunately, without the benefit of the linguist,
which I wish in hindsight we had one, however, we are
now looking at the possibility of engaging the service of a
linguist because when I came on the bench in 1984, some
of the instructions were one-paragraph long sentences. I
couldn't understand them. So, my goal since I've been a
member of this committee and I've been chair, and I've
been the chair since 1991. And so we continue to try to do
what you folks are talking about today. And that is to make
the instructions as understandable as we can. We put our
third edition-we're now up to the eighth edition this year
because we're putting it in a softbound volume each year
like the criminal committee is doing.
We tried to reach an eighth grade education level.
The computer tells us we reached a tenth grade level. You
know, we took out words like "exercise" and put in "use."
We eliminated "proximate." As I used to tell the jury when
I got to proximate cause, I would literally spell the word
out. I'm saying, "Proximate, P-r-o-x-i-m-a-t-e, not
approximate, like we're used to using in our everyday
language."
We've taken out other words to try to again use the
plain English language and not this stilted language that the
law has always used. So I hope that briefly explains the
process we use. I also have lay judges trying to make jury
instructions understandable for lay people.
PROFESSOR DUMAS: Thank you. Can I just say one
thing? The thing I'm most grateful for is that the word
"captious" disappeared from the reasonable doubt
instruction. I once asked a room full of linguists to define
the word captious for me. One person in the room offered
a definition.
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Were they right?
PROFESSOR DUMAS: I don't know.
MS. ASHLEY WHITE: Yes?
MR. BRADLEY SMITH: My name is Bradley Smith. This
question is actually for Professor Ross. In regard to your
statement about there being instructions that were factually
inaccurate, where we're actually asking the jury to do
something instructionally wrong, how much do you think
that ties into what Professor Tiersma stated about rape
identification? Not only telling them that it made a
difference, you're supposed to consider it, but actually
telling them why you're supposed to consider it? Do you
feel like by not only changing those instructions to be
accurate, but by telling the jurors why they were inaccurate,
do you think that would affect the outcome?
PROFESSOR ROSS: I think actually I would rewrite the
entire instruction regarding eyewitness identification
because when they talk about things like rape, that's
actually a category of variable that it's difficult for
psychologists to talk about. Because there's rape, stress, all
kinds of things that the eyewitness experiences. The field
of eyewitness identification has much clearer definitions
and instructions for jurors on how the police collected the
identification evidence. In fact, there are the Department of
Justice Guidelines instructing exactly what you should have
done.
The instructions should be not about the eyewitness.
The instruction should be about the procedures that were
used to collect the identification evidence, and whether
they followed the guidelines that had been published by the
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Department of Justice and have been sent to every law
enforcement agency in the United States.
So, cross-race ID is a tough one because even if it's
a cross race ID case, no one can tell you. No one. There's
no psychologist in the country who can tell you whether or
not a particular eyewitness is susceptible to making an error
because of cross-race ID. We can only talk in generality.
That's a misleading instruction. But what we can do is say,
"Look. There's agreed upon in the science among judges,
attorneys, the DOJ Guidelines about how the evidence
should have been collected. That's what the instructions
should be about. Not about what are called estimated
variables, things like cross-race identification. They're
looking at the wrong variables. So, I would rewrite the
whole instruction on something we really have much better
science on.
JUDGE BOB JONES: Judge Bob Jones, also a Professor of
Law. When you studied the screen between the minor and
the defendant, did you also study the impact upon the jurors
on the purity of instructions? The purity of instruction by
the judge about not letting the prejudice intercede about the
guilt of the defendant?
PROFESSOR ROSS: Yes. Yes, we did. And we looked at
a lot of the questions about that in terms of their reaction to
it, the reactions to the judge giving the instruction, and
things like that. But the thing that we found most
disturbing about the reaction to the instruction is we asked
them to recall it. Guess what percentage recalled it. Five
percent recalled the instruction, which I couldn't believe.
Five percent recalled the instruction.
That's another issue I think, in terms of jury
instructions and memory, is where do they fall. That
instruction fell in the middle of the trial. You know, for
example, an instruction like what we were talking about in
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regard to the eyewitness. Well, if you read it at the end,
after the testimony has already been given, how can a juror
go back, take that instruction and apply it to assessing the
credibility of a witness that they may have heard a week
ago? So, why not give the instruction just prior to the
presentation of the witness. We were very disappointed by
how many of the jurors couldn't even remember the
instruction.
MS. MEREDITH PASAY: I have a question about the
same study along those same lines. Because I was thinking
I don't know a lot about the details of the study. If the
instruction was, if you see the child on the screen, don't let
it affect your judgment about the guilt of the defendant, and
then it comes out that they find not guilty, and the
conviction rate goes up. So it seems like the instruction
makes it worse.
PROFESSOR ROSS: Well, we had a control group that
was compared to a control group that didn't get any
instructions. What we found with the instruction-so we
have one condition where they see the entire trial-and
what we did is we took actual cases that went before the
Supreme Court by hiring attorneys to write a model case.
We manipulated the presence or absence of the instruction.
It had no impact at all on conviction rate gain; the reason
being is I think only five percent remembered it. But then
again, the question is, well, if you do more and try to give it
more and more, the problem is it's still the wrong
instructions. The instruction should be don't let it
undermine your perceptions of the credibility of the child.
It's really not about the defendant. So, to answer, it was a
fascinating study. I can give it to you if you would like to
read it.
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MR. JOHN ROGERS: My name is John Rogers. I have a
question for the entire panel. I would hope that each of you
is more than aware of the fact that the institution that we're
talking about here, the American jury trial is not on the
verge of extinction, but certainly it's extremely ill. The
reduction in the number of trials that take place all across
this land, state or federal, has been fueled with a fire and
the fire generated by those institutions in our society like
the business roundtables, the insurance lobbyists to destroy,
to take away that fundamental right of all citizens. I want
to know, have any of you ever worked directly for the
Chamber of Commerce, been employed, had studies
funded, that you have been involved with, provided the
capital to administer those studies, and if it bothers you? If
it hasn't happened yet, would you do so, work for the very
forces in our society that are trying to deny every citizen
the right to a fair and impartial jury trial?
PROFESSOR AINSWORTH: I'd like to briefly comment.
You are actually talking about the elephant in the room that
nobody is talking about, which is that jury trials are a
vanishing species in our system. Mark Galanter wrote a
very influential article in 2004 called The Vanishing Trial:
An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts. All of the studies that have come out
since Professor Galanter's study have confirmed his
empirical findings that civil and criminal trials are going
away.
It's a very complex matter to figure out why this is
happening. For example, in the criminal area, which I'm
more familiar with, it is largely a function in federal court
of sentencing, with mandatory minimum sentences that
make it almost impossible to get your day in court without
risking five, ten, and even higher mandatory minimum
sentences unless you plea bargain. So it's a foolish
defendant who tries.
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On the state court level, it's also a function of
factors like the dramatically increasing case loads among
public defenders. I've been looking at situations where,
although the ABA suggests that 150 to 180 cases per
attorney per year is about the right caseload, there are
jurisdictions now in which public defenders are assigned
700, 800, 900 cases per attorney per year. We're talking
about felonies in many cases. Well, if you've got 900 cases
per year, I'm going to guarantee you're not going to try very
many of them.
On the civil side, there are a combination of factors
to point to. Things like damage caps in tort reform have
made it much more difficult to have get the kind of damage
awards that would make a jury trial economically plausible.
And so cases are simply settling on that basis rather than
going to trial. But in many respects, it may be that if we
came back here in twenty years to talk about jury
instructions, the question will be, why? If so few cases are
actually being tried to juries, is a jury instruction
conference somewhat of a sideshow compared to the real
issues that face us in terms of our civil and criminal justice
system? I agree you've raised a really important issue. I
hope and would like to believe that we can preserve the
jury trial. Because I think it's crucial. Somebody talked
about legitimacy. Today I think it's crucial to the
functioning of a legitimate justice system that there be
community input into its most important decisions.
PROFESSOR CLARK: Following up, very good question.
Personally, I've never done any work for private types of
organizations. I know there is a lot of money to be made.
You know, you get into especially pharmaceutical
companies and research studies that are done. Making
references, legitimizing justice system, recognizing even in
jury consultants there is a $450 million a year industry on
that. My research has always just been very pure, going
41
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 258
into it for recognizing and understanding something. Not
necessarily going into it and whatever the outcome may be,
but trying to understand that whether it's a positive or a
negative, this is a finding. And it's a finding. Not going
into it hoping to find something or steering it in a certain
manner.
I very much appreciate that question because of the
necessity to have an ordinary group of twelve persons-lay
persons-come in and render these verdicts. I don't want to
go to an expert of jurors. You've heard other countries
making use of jurors who are considered just experts. I'm
very much opposed to that. So I hope I have answered
your question.
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: Can I say just one thing about
that too? Although it is definitely true, trials and juries,
jury trials especially, have gone down quite a bit over the
last decade or two. Maybe to put it in perspective, on the
positive side, there are other countries that are starting to
adopt the jury system. For example, Japan and Korea have
started to use something like a jury system or what they
sometimes call lay assessors. So, even as-it's rather odd,
isn't it-that while jury trials are decreasing in the United
States, we've in a sense exported the idea to some other
countries, which are now starting to adopt it. So, there is a
positive note, I suppose, to that issue.
MR. ROGERS: One of the reasons I asked that question is
particularly with your presentation, I would think that-
well, while it was not intended for that purpose, I want you
to know I'm not complaining or insinuating in any way that
you would be for the annihilation of the jury system. But
when you point to this long litany of areas within the jury
instructions, which create this sort of imbecilic circus that
must go on in the jury deliberation room because they're
required to apply these impossible, nonsensical rules, I
42
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 259
think it does a disservice to the lawyers whose job it is to
explain many of the jury instructions. You know, we have
them before the jury is charged. We put them on board or
voir dire, and we explain to the jury what we believe. You
can't tell them what the law is, but we tell them what we
think about how to apply those laws to the facts of this
case.
All I want to say to all of you is that you need to
keep in mind that this analysis you're doing may only be
half the story. You have to take into account what the bar
is doing in the courtroom to bring to light this sometimes
archaic language. To deal with that archaic language in a
way that makes sense, makes common sense, and why the
American jury system still is the greatest form of resolving
disputes in the history of mankind.
PROFESSOR TIERSMA: I think I probably should
respond to that because I don't take your comments
personally. But you know, it's interesting that in
California, I've been involved for the last twelve years on
the effort in California to make jury instructions more
comprehensible. How did that start? It started out with the
riots basically in Los Angeles. It was an indirect result of
that and the O.J. Simpson case.
What we call the Rodney King case, which is the
case of Rodney King being badly beaten by these police
officers. The police officers were put to trial, and they
were acquitted. Then O.J. Simpson was acquitted. In
California, a lot of people began to think the jury system is
broken. Right? And so there was a blue ribbon
commission that was appointed by the State Supreme
Court, which basically made a lot of recommendations as to
how the jury system could be improved. They made many
recommendations, but one of them was that jury
instructions ought to be made more user-friendly.
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Our Chief Justice Ronald George took that, and
that's how this whole process began that I became involved
in-very involved in, I hate to think of how many hours I
spent on this whole process over the last twelve years. But
it's quite a few. But at any rate, I've been involved in that
as a result of this whole soul-searching that we went
through about the jury system and whether it is broken.
So, when we're talking about making jury
instructions more comprehensible, we're certainly not
talking about getting rid of the jury. What we're talking
about is making the process for jurors, involving them
more, making them more educated about what they're
doing, and making them more comfortable with the
process. It seems to me that that, in the long run, is going
to strengthen the jury system rather than undermine it. If
jurors know what they're doing, and they're not being
confronted with weird instructions and legalese that make
them feel like they're strangers to the system and we don't
really want them there because we don't make the effort to
address them personally, we don't address them as "you."
We always talk about "the jurors" and that sort of thing.
That really puts them off, and that's what we want to avoid.
Ultimately, this is about making jurors know what
they're doing, carry out their job better, and feel better
about the process after they've been through it because they
understood what was happening and they feel confident
about the verdict that they've reached. This is all about
strengthening the jury system. It's not about undermining it
in any sense.
PROFESSOR DUMAS: And just for the record, John, no, I
have never been engaged by one of these companies and
nor do I plan to be.
PROFESSOR ROSS: Ditto for me. To reiterate the same
spirit, I think all of us would share that same ideology that
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this work is designed to help preserve and to improve, not
to tear down and eliminate. So, the spirit is the opposite of
that.
MS. DOROTHY STULBERG: I'm Dorothy Stulberg. I
don't think it makes any difference what is happening if
nobody's having jury trials. So, I think his comment is
extremely important. None of us, as practicing lawyers,
want to go to jury trial. The insurance companies want us
to go to jury trials because the remedy is so low. There are
so many factors that come in before juries. I am scared to
death of what the Chamber of Commerce is doing. They
are specifically opposed. The business world is specifically
opposed to juries. They don't want the public to have some
concept of what justice is. So I-it scares me because I
agree-I think somebody said the value of twelve people
sitting there commenting on what's right for our world. It
bothers me, as a practicing attorney, that it looks like the
legal system is so strong because of the publicity of the
power structure. I think it's relevant to make it easier, but
make it easier, and nobody is going to use juries. Anyway,
that's my comment.
MS. ASHLEY WHITE: We have time for one more
question.
UNIDENTIFIED LAW STUDENT: You said earlier that
there is life outside of serving on a jury. That made me
think about a jury trial that I got to witness this summer.
After the jury selection process, the jurors that were
excused seemed excited, even seemed like they had dodged
a bullet because they didn't have to serve. That made me
think about whether you had come across any research or
thought of the possibility that either (a) jurors don't want to
serve on juries, and/or (b) they don't really care about the
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administration of justice and how does that affect the
system?
PROFESSOR CLARK: That's a great question. That's
amazing that you brought that up. I've got a study that's
being written up right now that deals with juries over the
period since 2000 and my involvement in conducting jury
research. I'm amazed that on that Monday morning when
the summoned jurors show up, and they go through the
orientation, I've absolutely been amazed at the number of
jurors that, for whatever it's worth, they'll get up and then
they'll run to get in line and say, "This is why I need to go.
This is why I've got to be excused." It's upsetting, and I
cannot believe it.
You can just guarantee that half of the people-if
there are 160, 80-something-are going to get up. What's
interesting is, again, touching on this issue of the
importance of dating back to 1215 of the Magna Carta of
the conscience of the community. Twelve persons coming
together and rendering a verdict, being that conscience of
the community and trying to have the pulse of right and
wrong as fellow citizens.
The number is startling of them trying to get out of
jury service, again, for whether it's medical reasons or
unjust or unsound issues. There is a lot of evidence that
does indicate that jurors-what are they going to get out of
this experience? What are they going to get out? In
Alabama, for example, if you're paying jurors $10.00 a day,
I mean you know, and they're saying, "What am I going to
get out of this?"
So many persons see this as a job to the extent, as a
liability, as frustration and aggravation. That's why we're
trying to improve the jury system, and along with this,
making it user-friendly. Let's make the jury system user-
friendly and keep trying. It's almost like you have to go
back to Civics again. Listen, this is a privilege that you can
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serve on a jury, and you must understand that. I think we
need to do a better job of conveying that message. But it's
amazing how jurors and persons come together. I learned
this a long time ago from a judge that the juries and persons
being summoned for duty, they're wheels, if you will, to the
extent that when you're a defendant and you're on the
fourth floor, and on the first floor there's 160 people down
there, wow. That really, that gets it going, don't it?
So, the importance of having those jurors. But I am
amazed, and studies indicate again the frustration,
aggravation, low pay, what am I going to get out of this. I
don't have time for this. Accompanied with what I said
about their own lives and what they're going through, the
dysfunction, if you will, and issues. It makes it very tough.
Okay, it's tough, but that's the reality. And that's what I
wanted to indicate to everyone: the reality of what we're
dealing with. The reality of the world that we live in, in
2009 is not easy. But we must understand who we're
dealing with and how we can improve it. And I think that's
what we're doing today.
INTRODUCTION
MS. JESYCA WESTBROOK: Good afternoon, ladies and
gentlemen. My name is Jesyca Westbrook, and I'm the
Candidacy Process Editor for the Tennessee Journal of Law
and Policy. I'm also the logistics chair for this symposium.
Before I introduce Judge Dann, I would first like to thank
him again for graciously being here. We could not ask for
a better outcome after Mr. Munsterman could not join us.
Today we also could not ask for a more experienced
or distinguished afternoon keynote speaker. Judge Dann is
a retired Phoenix, Arizona Superior Court Judge with over
twenty years of experience on the bench, five of them spent
as Chief Judge. After retiring in 2000, instead of playing
golf as many others do, he then completed two visiting
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fellowships at the National Center for State Courts and the
National Institute of Justice.
His dedication to jury research, jury trial
innovations, and reform has helped to shape the future of
jury trials in the U.S. And he's a nationwide leader in the
effort to transform the way courts view jurors. He has been
called a pioneer trailblazer in the field and, as a result, has
received the William Rehnquist Award for Judicial
Excellence and the ABA Inaugural Jury Impact Award.
So, on behalf of the Center for Advocacy and Dispute
Resolution, The Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, and
the Summers-Wyatt Symposium, please join me in
welcoming Judge B. Michael Dann.
COMMENTS OF MICHAEL DANN
JUDGE DANN: Thank you. And did you say retired or
tired? Today it's both. Good afternoon. I'm really happy
to be here. Sad that Tom Munsterman couldn't make it.
Many of you know Tom. Tom is a good friend of thirty
years and a walking encyclopedia on matters having to do
with the American jury.
Maybe you don't know about Tom. He has no legal
background, training, education, experience. He, by
background and education, is a mechanical engineer,
electrical, one of those. He was called to Federal Court for
a jury trial in a drug transaction sale case or something and
was so taken, moved, and unmoved by the experience that
he wrote the judge after the trial and said, "Have you ever
considered doing things a little differently with regard to
the jury's needs?" The judge welcomed the letter and
invited Tom to come in to chat. They had a nice visit, and
Tom shared his wisdom with the judge. The judge
suggested that Tom, since he had so much to offer, consider
going into the business of juries and jury trials.
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Tom took him seriously and founded his own firm,
which was eventually a jury research and re-engineering, if
you will, re-engineering the jury trial. His small firm was
absorbed by the National Center for State Courts, where he
has remained for twenty-some years. He's a wonderful
guy, who has visited probably every state and a lot of
foreign countries. I know he spent a lot of time in Russia
recently, as they have made halting attempts to adopt some
form of jury that fits the Russian culture and politics. And
Japan, and Korea, and so forth. Maybe you've had the
pleasure of hearing him before. He's a very urbane fellow.
Speaking for myself, I'm undergoing urban renewal.
Maybe some of you miss Tom already.
The pleasure, finally, after years of hearing about
Peter Tiersma and reading his work, and knowing of its
impact nationally on the movement to produce
understandable jury instructions and to improve jury
comprehension. It's the first time I've had the chance to
press his flesh, as LBJ used to say, to hear him live and
making a presentation. Peter, thank you for all your work.
I don't think it's any coincidence that his work
.followed soon after release of the monumental ABA study
on jury comprehension in complex civil cases in 1988 or
thereabout. It showed that juries indeed do manifest a lot
of confusion in cases involving complex civil cases,
involving complex issues, technical and so forth. Over
fifty percent of the source of jury confusion in these cases
is attributable and traceable to the judge's jury instructions.
Over half of their errors and sources of confusion are the
judge's own jury instructions. Something judges and/or
lawyers, you may consider have full control over and have
had forever.
Take our own Arizona jury instructions. Please
take them. When I went there fresh out of school in the
mid to late '60s, and this was before any reform or rewrites
and the committee. I don't know about the rest of you, but I
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think bench bar committees who are tasked to rewrite
instructions to make them understandable, composed solely
of lawyers and judges, are wholly incapable of reaching
that goal, wholly incapable of doing that.
If unaided by experts in the field, non-lawyer
experts in the field of linguistics, psychology, etc., and by
former jurors and without road testing them, subject to
being evaluated by appropriate experts and feedback to the
committee as to how the road testing went. I think we
lawyers and judges need to recognize that, you know, law
schools sharpen the mind all right. But in my experience,
they sharpened my mind by narrowing it. There was
precious little when I went to school pre-war-I forget
what war it was, but pre-war; there have been so many-
precious little on appreciating what other disciplines have
to tell us, to inform us, law students, lawyers, judges, etc.
There have been published articles by folks who
study the judicial process and the legislative process,
showing that judges and legislators pay little heed to the
work of social scientists, psychologists, sociologists, and so
forth, and so on in writing laws and procedures and then
designing court processes. Pay little heed. That's a very
recent article.
Well, let me share with you my favorite Arizona
jury instruction. Our task was to take the Law French,
Latin, and legalese-and translate it. Our goal was not to
reach plain English, but to go from all of that to plain Latin.
So this is what we came up with early on [indicating
projected document]. For those of you are sight impaired, I
apologize. "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are
instructed that the crime of theft requires not only proof of
actus reus, but also mens rea, or in more understandable
terms, animus furandi."
"In considering the evidence, you may determine
the facts under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Remember, however, that ignorantia non-excusat, or as the
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courts popularly put it, that's necessitas non habit legen.
The defendant's defense is assumpsit. One or the other of
these theories may not apply to the case sub judice. In that
event, you should apply the rule of inclusio unius est
exclusio, alterius, so as to choose between ex parte and ex
hypolthese." I like it.
Well, you get the idea. Are we asking too much?
Of course. But we're not asking too much of ourselves.
Jurors. Something we have to weigh. Peter's suggestion
today and in this slide, and in one of his slides, an
interesting suggestion. He asks, well, why don't we turn to
the jury after we've read the instructions to them, and
hopefully, they've read along from their copy that they have
in front of them, each of the jurors. Someone said, "Well,
our court can't afford a copy for each juror, so we'll give
them one." Oh, really, who gets the one copy? Who gets
to read from it while the judge is reading it? Studies show
that comprehension goes up when they can read and hear at
the same time.
A copy for everyone in this day and age of rapid,
inexpensive duplications and so forth. A copy for every
juror. Turn to the jury box and say, "Okay. Having just
read the instructions to you, and you have your own copies
in front of you, I'll take questions during your deliberations
if you have any. You can write questions, in writing, then
I'll meet with the attorneys, and we'll get back to you. Ask
them right then and there in addition to an invitation, do
any of you, at this early juncture, do any of you have any
questions about what you just heard and read? I'll be happy
to take them."
In Arizona when I voiced that suggestion to the
judges, they said, "Oh, my God, no. I can't do that. (1) I
would embarrass the jurors and put them under pressure,
making them feel like they have to come up with questions,
or-that's speculative-or (2) they might actually have a
question, and that might embarrass me. Or I'd get in
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trouble with the Appellate Court for answering, for not
answering, or the way I answered, or what I said or didn't
say." Fear of reversal. So that suggestion has gone
nowhere in Arizona so far. But we will come back another
day and make another run at it.
I've done it, and I've never been embarrassed. Of
course, nothing would embarrass me. I think, in the five to
ten times I've tried it, maybe one question has come up.
They just don't feel comfortable. But they sure feel
comfortable later during deliberations in asking questions.
Some of those questions about the instructions are among
the most difficult.
I'm supposed to talk about the modem jury. In the
vernacular, in the words of the billboard sign, we've come a
long way, baby, since the mid '60s. We have been
somewhat successful, I think, all of us working together, of
dragging the traditional form of jury trial and jury service,
kicking and screaming first into the twentieth century.
We're still working to drag them into the twenty-first
century.
I think a lot of this work started in the mid '60s with
the publication of Kalvin and Zeisel's landmark study, The
American Jury. The first major effort to study real world
juries and jurors-reality, facts, fact-based, empirical. It
opened the door to a whole generation of researchers and
social scientists. Some judges and lawyers joined the
movement, all card-carrying members of the movement.
The result was a lot of research, surveys, studies, writing
articles, and so forth, and so on. There's a flood of
information out there for us lawyers and judges to take
advantage of, policy makers, legislators, etc. A whole
subset of scientists and social scientists developed called
jury experts.
In the meantime, during this period, beginning '50s,
'60s, trials began, although maybe falling off in number
attributable to a number of causes-I think no single
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cause, but for the reasons, some of which you've heard
mentioned here today. The number of trials has
diminished. I think another reason not mentioned yet is a
lack of trust in juries and lay people deciding these
disputes. On the other hand, Trials grew more complex
on the theory that any case worth litigating, civil or
criminal, is worth at least one expert. And one expert is
worth the other side producing a rebuttal expert. Well,
since I'm calling one, let's make it three. Okay, three
versus two or three. Suddenly American juries have been
confronted in just what used to be a run-of-the-mill case or
street crime with a handful of experts, many of whom don't
agree on important points of evidence.
This makes it so that it's now more difficult to sort
out who has the better evidence. The battle of experts and
so forth; complex scientific evidence and terminology. So
it's our job to help them the best we can. Public
dissatisfaction with the American jury has started to
increase or grow, given the result of certain high-profile
civil and criminal trials in the '90s and 2000.
Then we had the ABA stuff that I mentioned. Since
then, and because of all this coming about, over twenty-five
states, including, I'm happy to say, Tennessee, have
conducted their own, as have two or three federal circuits,
the Ninth and the Seventh. Also, the D.C. Circuit,
Washington D.C. Have conducted their own,
thoroughgoing soup-to-nuts study of their jury system, and
decided for themselves what they would like to change.
And they've set about to do so.
Tennessee adopted, as I read, the Cullins summary
of the 2003 amendments, Civil and Criminal Rules,
adopted thirteen important innovations for changes.
Tennessee Jury Practice. And because of this work, the
model of the active juror emerged. I don't know who
originated it, but an active juror replacing the older
tradition model. A tradition of 200, 300 years. The passive
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juror model. Now, we've heard those terms applied to
judges. An active judge versus a passive judge. A
magistrate trial versus a passive umpire. Just sits back and
waits to be called upon.
But it applies to jurors too. What do they mean by
active juror model? I'd like to think that it means to give
the jurors the tools they need, some of the tools being
participatory in nature. You create an action activity,
giving active jurors the tools they need to help them better
decide today's cases, civil and criminal, and to reach better
verdicts or to have a greater comfort level with their own
verdict. And hopefully a greater public acceptance and
understanding of the verdict. All consistent with due
process. In other words, without depriving anyone of a fair
trial. And I think that none of the Tennessee changes-
thirteen changes or innovations-rule changes, if properly
managed and controlled by the court is going to deprive
anyone of a fair trial.
Our goal should be a fair trial. Insuring a fair trial,
not necessarily a perfect trial, without undue fear of
reversal. I think we're calling upon appellate judges to cut
us more slack, possibly the trial judges and lawyers. More
slack to be innovative, to experiment a little bit with those
instructions, to adapt them to the case at hand, to help make
them more understandable. Judges, in my experience-too
many judges, not all by any means-have a heightened fear
of reversal. And I think exaggerated. I mean, what's the
worst that can happen? If a case gets sent back and tried by
someone else, of course it's embarrassing. You can be
censured. You can be removed, flogged and so forth,
impeached, but that's the worst thing that can happen to
you.
All this culminated in the 2005 ABA, the lawyers'
own professional association, telling us, "Yeah, these
things are good for America, for the American jury, and for
the future to help assure the future of a vibrant, functioning,
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well-functioning jury." The ABA standards, or principles
as they are called, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials.
This little booklet. I heartily recommend that you get one.
Each principle or standard black letter is followed by a
good commentary citing the reasons for the thing and the
legal support.
For example, Principle 13, Paragraph F, black letter,
jurors in civil cases may be instructed-may, not must-
may be instructed that they will be permitted to discuss the
evidence among themselves in the jury room during
recesses from trial when all are present, as long as they
reserve judgment about the outcome of the case until
deliberations commence. That's the language. And the
commentary goes on for a page or so to explain why, and
how, and what, and so forth.
I've done it in civil, criminal cases, including
murder cases. A fellow on death row being retried for five
murders. The jury reached an impasse. I'm sorry-I'm
off-base. In Arizona, this procedure is mandatory. We
must instruct civil juries accordingly in Arizona, in Indiana,
and some other states, that they may discuss the case
among themselves, etc., subject to these structured jury
instructions-structured jury discussions they call them. I
was thinking of another procedural change and innovation.
We may get to that later; it is one that I've tried and with
success in murder cases.
So, the ABA Jury Standard, this is the most recent
word or collection of words on the subject. Of course,
we've had two, or three, or four National Jury Summits
since all this started. All right, where are we? I think the
changes, and updates, innovations, reforms, call them what
you will, fall into three or four-at least three general
categories. The first category being that it all has to do
with justice. Doing justice with this and justice with that.
Juries serve the cause justice. In the name of doing
justice to jury service, I think we've increased the
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representativeness and diversity of our jury, of the juries
we're seeing, as a result of such reforms as coming up with
new source lists. Not limiting ourselves to the voters or
driver's license or both, but moving beyond those one or
two lists to other kinds of source lists, broadening the pool
of eligible people to call. Modem, updating our source list.
One day, one trial. Especially in urban areas; I
know this may not be practical in rural, small, lightly
populated counties or circuits. But one day, one trial in
urban areas greatly increases the number of people called
and makes for more rapid turnover, shorter terms of jury
service. One day. If you're not selected that one day,
you're done. Or one trial. If you're selected for a trial, you
serve that trial, whether it's three days, or three weeks, or
three months. So then you're done. Whatever the numbers.
However long the numbers. Three years. Two years. Four
years. That depends on the population, and so on and so
forth.
Creature comforts such as, well, increases in pay,
realistic payment for mileage, making arrangements for
parking. I know we've got a long way to go on parking and
pay in many states. You heard about what, in Alabama-
some states are lower than $10.00 a day. What is it here?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Eleven.
JUDGE DANN: Yeah. It's not supposed to be a profit-
making endeavor. I don't think we have to worry about
$40.00 a day or even minimum wage per day or per hour
even being harmful to the process. Efforts to provide paid-
for child care at the courthouse. I think, again, urban courts
ought to consider that. So mothers of young children,
caretakers of young children can have a greater chance to
participate. And efforts to deal with juror stress.
Recognition that there is considerable stress in serving on
the jury. Not just a criminal-a horrific criminal case-but
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a long civil case. Sometimes just the sheer length of a trial
is oppressive and stressful. It's all new and different.
A juror told me, who sat on a Tucson murder
case-we had five former jurors on our reform jury
innovations committee, and that's probably the wisest
decision we made in terms of membership. Yeah, we had a
token law school professor too. Five former jurors were
worth their weight in gold. They held our feet to the fire
and said, "You can't justify, judges and attorneys, you can't
justify giving centuries old practice. Maybe it's time to
take a look at it. I mean we don't buy your justification that
you've always done it that way. That's no justification.
That's a cop-out."
But this Tucson juror told me-he was on the
committee in Arizona-he said, "You know, we're not
stupid. These jurors who come to the courthouse to serve,
who are fortunate enough to be selected. We're not stupid,
but we're ignorant. This is a strange, new world to most of
us who are called. Most of us for the first time. And it's
intimidating and stressful, and a lot of it we don't
understand. So in that sense we're ignorant, but we're not
stupid. The trouble with you judges and lawyers is that you
treat us both-both at once-as both stupid and ignorant."
As brilliant too, he might have added. Because we expect
them to make all these grand decisions.
There are some other things that are being done
regarding term of service, conditions of service, to be more
palatable. But justice for service. Justice for
comprehension or cognition. Cognitive justice, I like to
call it. Procedural justice. Various procedural aids
intended to increase comprehension and give today's jurors
a better shot at a chance to understand today's cases. The
law and the evidence. You know, you start with plain
English, a rewrite of jury instructions.
Pre-instructing the jury before they start hearing the
evidence, or even opening statements with as much
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substantive law, in addition to the usual housekeeping
stuff-that's important-but give them as much substantive
law as you can about the case. The burdens of proof, the
necessary definition of legal terms, the elements of the
crime or what a plaintiff must prove in a medical
malpractice case. Don't wait until the very end of a case to
tell them.
It would be like asking me to watch, understand,
and enjoy a game of cricket without telling me what in the
devil is going on. What are they doing and why, and so
forth. Give them a road map in advance to follow, and
they're more likely to reach the destination that we want.
Pre-instructions. Copies of the instructions for every juror.
Allowing jurors to put questions in writing through the
judge, with the attorneys and then the judge, the question
should go forward. If it stands any objection, the attorneys
can object out of their presence. Maybe you're doing that
already here.
Structured jury discussions. Maybe a pilot project
might be in order in civil cases to see how that works. Use
of-in complex or lengthy trials-multi-purpose jury
notebooks. Not for every case, but if it's important, it's
hard work, and a lot of work for the judge's staff to
determine to get it right. Not allowing each side to prepare
and bring in their own notebooks. That kind of notebook
would be more advocacy. And the judge loses control over
the notebooks then. The judge should, in pre-trial
meetings, make assignments. You prepare this and
exchange it before we come back next time and reach an
agreement on a glossary of terms, legal and technical terms
in the case. You prepare your witness list, get it to him by
e-mail, and so forth. Come back with the first witness list
explaining, listing, the names of witnesses and their
affiliation at the time of the events. Not necessarily now
but so the jurors can deliberate. Juror notebooks.
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Allowing entry of summaries, reading, and giving
the final instructions before closing arguments, rather than
waiting until after. There's always the housekeeping stuff
to take care of after the closing arguments conclude. So,
both before and after they hear from the judge. The judge
should be the one making the instructions clear. That's the
judge's principle responsibility. We shouldn't be relying on
lawyers through advocacy, arguments and comments to the
jury at trial to explain the instructions. That's the judge's
job. Every time that happens, too often when the lawyers
get into explaining and reading ("Ladies and gentlemen,
you're about to hear this final instruction read," and this is
what they get wrong. They're advocating, and they're
arguing their case. And you don't want that kind of
emphasis or slant put on it. The judge has responsibility for
instructing the jury after hearing from the lawyers.
Debriefing, I agree with whoever said it. I've found
that debriefing jurors as a group, having them in the judge's
chambers or going into the jury room, onto their turf and
having a casual visit, without robe and taking the jacket off
and so forth, talking with the jurors about their experience.
And listen, I've learned so much. Maybe most of what I
needed to know about jury changes, innovations from
former jurors. It's like the book: "I learned what I needed
about life in kindergarten." I learned it from former jurors.
These people have almost always done their very
best to get it right. You may not always agree with the
result, but they work very hard. They take it very seriously,
to a man and to a woman, to get it right, to do justice, given
the tools they have and the evidence and so forth and so on.
Very conscientious. They take a lot of pride in their work.
And one of the questions is, "Judge, do you agree with our
verdict?" Usually I skirt around that. There's no point in
my telling them that. Your job isn't over yet. But talking
to them in general terms about their experience, not asking
them why they found a certain way or how they might have
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reached a verdict, but how did the trial procedure strike
you. And they'll give you some wonderful feedback.
Debriefing. Now attorneys, a lot of the judges will
debrief but not permit the attorneys to talk to them. A lot
of judges, especially in the federal side, in my experience,
don't allow lawyers to talk with the jurors post-verdict.
They just have a blanket rule. I think that's a mistake. It's
possible for the judge to invite the jurors, those who wish
of their own free will and volition to stay behind to chat
with the attorneys, telling them; it's very valuable as a
litigator, as a trial attorney, to get some feedback from
jurors. These attorneys are not going to grill you on why or
how. A lot of attorneys regret that they don't have that
opportunity. I think we ought to consider giving it to them
in a structured, careful way. And maybe have a bailiff, or a
court staff person present to interrupt if there's any
overreaching, or abuse, or browbeating by attorneys. But
attorneys, you know, they're not going to want to offend the
jurors.
Okay. That's cognitive justice. Substantive. I think
the next way you can reform will be taking a look at the
substantive power and reach, jurisdiction, of the American
jury. It started a few years ago with a group of decisions:
Apprendi v. New Jersey, Ring v. Arizona, and recent-let's
see, the most recent decision I think is Ice v. Oregon-
struck a cautionary note, telling us that juries are the ones
who must decide certain categories of disputed facts
necessary for the judge's decision. For the judge to do so
becomes sentencing, death penalty qualifications, that kind
of consideration. Jurors must decide those issues and may
come to a verdict or make findings, and then the judge,
based upon those findings, does the judge thing-imposes
sentence, or makes a death/life decision.
But mind you, several states have gone to jury
sentencing in death penalty cases, something I find
troubling. The legislatures said, "Well, the Supreme
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Court's ruled juries must decide these death penalty cases."
That's not what the Supreme Court held in Rain. The
Supreme Court said, "They must make certain findings of
dispute. Resolve certain issues of disputed fact."
But the death penalty is supposed to be reserved for
the worst of the worst; it's not intended for every homicide.
And almost every murder has its grizzly, if not horrific,
heinous, aspect. But the death penalty is supposed to be
reserved for the most egregious, the worst of the worst.
The worst of the bad. How on Earth can a one-shot jury
determine which is the worst of the worst? They have no
basis for comparison, where the judge over time sees and
hears a lot of these cases and can better determine, or a
panel of two or three judges working together, on a series
of two or three minds. I think Colorado has gone to this.
I'm not certain if it's Colorado. But two or three judges sit
and make that ultimate decision, life or death. Because
they're better able to see a variety of cases and better able
to identify which is the worst of the worst. The jury, to
them the case they hear is the worst of the worst because it
probably is. I'll get off my soapbox.
But the jury's jurisdiction and power is expanding.
And you may hear more about what some people refer to as
the nullification debate. One argument is that the Sixth
Amendment, the right to an impartial jury, along with the
history of the English-American-the American jury
creates some space, allows, and mandates some space for
the jury at a particular point in the criminal case. We must
allow room, as judges and lawyers, trial and appellate, must
reserve some room for the jury to exercise some discretion.
It's called mercy sometimes. It's called community
conscience sometimes.
When, for them to convict, for example, when all of
the elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
you typically tell them, "You must convict. You shall
convict." Two-thirds of the state and federal courts handle
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it that way. As if we're attempting and we fear the
nullification so much that to eliminate jury nullification,
not just to find it, but to eliminate it altogether by telling
the juror, the jury, they can't. They don't have that right.
No, you cannot. You must find, according to these
instructions, you must convict. Telling the jury to convict
under any circumstances; is that consistent with the Sixth
Amendment? The right of the jury to exercise some wiggle
room perhaps to acquit when to convict, would do violence
to a strongly held conscientious belief of theirs and the
belief of the community. But to convict would be a terrible
injustice.
Spousal-assisted suicide. You name the case. I
don't care. Some drug cases. You know, mandatory three-
strikes laws. Is the jury simply a computer, or is it intended
to reflect the sentiment, which if it ignores, it causes great
injustice and calls the law itself into question? The
credibility of the law may be at stake in such cases. I think
that debate remains to be resolved. But it might be the next
debate.
It comes down in my book to being honest and
respectful, honest with the jury and respectful of the jury.
If you feel that way-what's the word--empathy. In other
words, try to put our-step out of our judge and attorney
advocate roles-and put ourselves in the place of the juror
hearing these debated cases, and ask ourselves, well, what
tools would we like? How would we like to have a case
presented? What tools would we like to have? What
would I like to have if I were sitting there charged with the
responsibility of deciding this person's fate? That will
answer a lot of questions for us. Not all, but, I mean, there
are limitations.
Where are we going from here? What does the
future hold? There will be suggestions for more-to speed
up the trial process, make it less expensive for presentation
of videotaped testimony rather than live. Virtual trials have
62
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 279
been suggested and speculated about by some. That is
where the jurors don't-the actors, including the jurors-
don't even come together in the same place. They are
aware of who they are. We're all watching the same
presentation on the computers and weigh in with questions
and deliberations, a chat room for deliberations. I'm very
leery about that. At some point, even I become a
traditionalist and want to preserve the face-to-face
deliberations, the exchange, viewing witnesses, etc. So, I'm
not a big fan of the suggestion of virtual trials.
A word needs to be said I think about evaluating
these procedures or doing a pilot study if you're leery.
Have it evaluated by experts to get the feedback, rather
than relying on suppositions and assumptions, and age-old
understandings. In Arizona, the Arizona Supreme Court
opened up a whole bunch of trials, criminal and civil, to
study by some of the experts you've heard named: Hans,
Diamond, Munsterman, and others. Fifty civil trials, jury
trials in Tucson were-and deliberations with the parties'
consent-lawyers', jurors', and so forth and so on-
consent. The Supreme Court's consent, conditional.
Videotaped and produced six or eight articles, some of
which are listed in your materials, evaluating juror
discussions, jury deliberations, etc., and answering many of
our questions. Resolving some of our fears, and not
resolving others, leaving them open. Empathy, trust, fear
of reversal. Was it Erica Jong who wrote Fear of Flying?
Did she pass away? Well, if she's still with us, I wish she
would do a book for us that is Fear of Reversal.
Okay. Questions about anything I've said or haven't
said; Arizona's experience, or experience in other states?
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
MR. JEFFREY BELEW: I'm Jeffrey Belew. I've got a
question not necessarily for you, but maybe for some of the
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judges this time. We've implemented some of those things
that he suggested with jurors. I was curious what Judge
Thomas or some of the other judges would chime in on jury
questions during the trial. What have you found to be,
percentage-wise, good questions, questions that would
just-obviously a lot of times they know it's insurance,
which we don't let come in, in Tennessee. But what has
been your experience with some of the questions that have
been asked of the jurors during the trials?
JUDGE MCGINLEY: I'm Creed McGinley, and I'm a
judge in a rural district. I try a whole lot of jury cases.
And I was actually part of the pilot project that we've
referred to. They pulled me screaming and kicking into
this thing on some of the issues. I'm doing everything right
now that is suggested here as far as jury notebooks,
complete instructions. I charge them as much as I can on
the front end. I'm allowing juror questions. It has not been
any problem whatsoever. You relatively, you hardly ever
have questions. And when you do, sometimes it actually
suggests to the attorneys some deficiencies in their
presentation. And if a jury trial was a search for the truth,
then I think that's appropriate. But these things, everyone
having a copy of the instructions. A lot of these things that
I said couldn't be done, I'm doing every one of them now
because I can tell the difference in these cases.
MR. BELEW: Is that before the trial or after the trial?
JUDGE MCGINLEY: The what?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You said there were
deficiencies identified by the questions jurors asked. Are
they asking those questions after the presentation or before?
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JUDGE MCGINLEY: Yes, that's when you charge them
that after witnesses testify, but before they are excused.
They're permitted to ask questions and so forth and so on.
And sometimes it will bring up something that likely
should be developed. And the attorneys, I think probably
both sides appreciate it because it helps them.
JUDGE DANN: If I can join in on that. One way to look at
it is that there's no such thing as a bad juror question, as
even the bad or off-the-wall question-what we think was
off-the-wall-is important to that juror. Otherwise, the
juror would not have taken the time and trouble in reaching
out for help with something.
JUDGE MCGINLEY: You do have to screen because ....
JUDGE DANN: Oh, sure.
JUDGE MCGINLEY: They will ask questions that are not
appropriate as far as the Rules of Evidence.
JUDGE DANN: My favorite question in a criminal case
asked the testifying defendant, "Well, if you didn't do this
crime, do you know who did?" You've heard of that. But
these strange or bad questions we do have sometimes alert
the judge and the lawyers that something may need to be
better done about that misunderstanding to clear up
something, add, clarify, and so forth. It does take
additional time in the trial, and you have to vent it with the
attorneys, give them a chance to object outside. But in my
book, we can take the time-the trade-off is worth it. Juror
satisfaction, juror comprehension is worth it-and the care
we like to think we take with these matters, these serious
matters. It's worth the trade-off, the extra time and effort.
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DEAN BLAZE: Judge, following up on this. What about
re-argument in response to some of the questions? If I
remember correctly, there were a number of times in
Arizona when this was done, I don't know if you did it or
Judge Martone.
JUDGE DANN: Yeah, both of us did it. Judge Marton and
I did it in different homicide cases. This procedure was
also approved by the ABA. It's called in some courts re-
opening for additional argument, instruction, or even
evidence sometimes. That is, the juror reaches-you get
the familiar note-I think we've reached an impasse. Now,
where they noticed this word impasse is beyond me. But
they know what word to use, the magic word impasse. So
instead of calling them into the jury room and saying, "Are
you really?" and then leading, the next conversation is,
"Are you hopelessly deadlocked? You are, aren't you?"
And lead them through-we do this dance, tradition dance,
and a mistrial.
Well, the only thing worse than trying some of these
cases once is trying them twice, needlessly so. At that first
mention of a possible mistrial, Arizona law allows-it
doesn't require-it depends on the circumstances, judge's
discretion, to ask the deliberating jury, "I received your
note. You think you've reached an impasse on one or all
counts or whatever. If you would like to do so, but only if
you want, please write down the issues that divide you that
have led to an impasse, if the issue is having to do with the
evidence, or the instructions, or a combination. And I will
take your list up with the lawyers and we'll see what, if
anything, we can do to assist you in moving along and
avoiding deadlock." And the note comes out.
Sometimes they say, "We don't want to" or "We
can't list anything. We can't even agree on what to list,
what our differences are." Or they'll list three things or
four things. Among those three or four, there are two or
66
5:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 283
three, or maybe just one that you're able to address. You
do that through additional argument. Ask the attorneys to
supplement their argument on this point. How does the law
of conspiracy, for example, in a murder case, tie in this
particular defendant? How does it relate to this defendant?
Well, the law on conspiracy is enough to choke
even a knowledgeable Tennessee attorney and let alone lay
jurors. It's complex, heavy-duty stuff. So you allow the
attorneys, as we did, half an hour each. The jury went back
in this murder case, and an hour and a half or so later they
came out with verdicts acquitting on some counts and
convicting on others. It helped them; they said post trial in
a debriefing. Now, sometimes you can't. Your hands are
tied. You can't call in additional witnesses or something in
the record. You've got the burden of proof, the jeopardy
considerations, and all that due process. Sometimes you
can do something and save the trial, save the investment to
the public and private money.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Judge, I was just going to
follow up on what Judge McGinley said about juror
questions. The juror questions are a golden opportunity for
the lawyers to get into the minds of the jurors about what
they're thinking during the trial. And one other thing that
I've added that's not specifically provided for in our Rule:
eleven juror questions. To allow each side follow-up
questions if a witness brings out new information that
neither attorney has gotten out of their questions, then I
allow each side one opportunity to ask follow-up questions
of them.
SECOND UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I go back to direct
and cross or whatever. After I've determined the question
is appropriate with the lawyers, asked the juror the
questions, and they get the answers from the witness. And
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then I'll say, "Anything further from this side? Anything
further from that side?"
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I've had more than one
lawyer say, "Judge, that's a great question. I wish I had
thought of that."
JUDGE DANN: Thank you. If you still miss Tom
Munsterman at this point, that's your problem.
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